NTSB REPORT re: Chris Lord Cavalon ..... Released the other day ..... I selected some portions and highlighted portions of it .... pretty sobering reading as far as "build quality" and "inspections"
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/Repor ... L&IType=FAOn October 30, 2018, about 1448 eastern daylight time, an experimental amateur-built AutoGyro Cavalon gyroplane, N198LT, was destroyed during collision with a power pole, wires, terrain, a residence and a post-crash fire following a forced landing in Sebring, Florida. The commercial pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were fatally injured.
The purpose of the accident flight was for the pilot to take the passenger back to his home airport. Witnesses stated the pilot flew the accident gyroplane earlier in the day for about 2 hours, serviced it with fuel, then he and the passenger departed on the accident flight.
SEF was not tower-controlled, but a commercial website that monitored the common traffic advisory frequency recorded a mayday call from the gyroplane at 1448. During the next 18 seconds, part of the gyroplane's registration number and a second mayday call were transmitted before the sounds associated with impact were heard. During the audible portions of the transmissions, sounds consistent with an engine increasing and decreasing in rpm were heard.
According to FAA records, the gyroplane's airworthiness certificate was issued August 17, 2017. Airframe logbooks were not recovered, but photographs of maintenance entries revealed the most recent condition inspection was completed October 4, 2018 at
16.6 total aircraft hours.Postaccident interviews, e-mails, and collected documents revealed that the owner/builder purchased the gyroplane kit from the German kit manufacturer through AutoGyro USA, Stevensville, Maryland, along with a "build-assist" agreement with Cloud9 Helicopters, West Palm Beach, Florida, an independent dealer of AutoGyro USA products.
The owner/builder had no experience building or flying aircraft of any kind. His intention was to build the gyroplane and then learn to fly it.
Cloud9 Helicopters agreed to perform the build-assist in exchange for 75 flight hours in the completed gyroplane in order to demonstrate the product to prospective customers for future sales.
After an experienced factory mechanic could not be arranged by the CEO of AutoGyro USA, Cloud9 Helicopters
employed a mechanic who had not previously assembled an AutoGyro product, which conservatively required 3 weeks for assembly by an experienced builder.
Later, an experienced AutoGyro builder, who could provide only one week's help was brought in to temporarily assist with building efforts.
Upon arrival, the experienced builder directed that the
gyroplane be disassembled because components had been installed incorrectly and in the wrong sequence.
He found all the parts, components, and hardware had arrived with the kit, but they were packaged haphazardly, and considerable time was expended as the contents of the boxes were inventoried and organized for assembly. Further, common consumables (adhesives, lubricants, etc.) were not on hand and had to be purchased. According to the owner/builder, he "spent a lot of time going to Home Depot
After the airworthiness certificate was issued, the gyroplane was test flown for the phase one testing period
(40 hours). The test pilot hired to complete the flight testing stated that the test plan was modeled after FAA Advisory Circular 90-89A, Amateur-Built Aircraft and Ultralight Flight Testing Handbook. As part of the plan, the test pilot performed engine run-ups, system checks (pre-rotator, etc), high-speed taxi tests and short "hops" over the runway about 20 ft above the ground.
The test pilot stated that during the testing the cyclic control exhibited a "sharp left pull" and that he explained the issue to maintenance personnel. The test pilot also stated that multiple exchanges with maintenance personnel and AutoGyro USA failed to resolve the issue.
The test pilot further stated that he "grounded" the gyroplane at that time due to "improperly rigged flight controls" and indicated that
he would not fly the gyroplane again until it was fixed. At the time that the test pilot ceased the test plan, the gyroplane had accrued
16.6 hours.According to the owner/builder, the CEO of AutoGyro USA and the president of Cloud9 Helicopters were
"not available" in the months following to
complete the fly-off. In March 2018, the CEO of AutoGyro USA resigned his position and went to work for a competing gyroplane manufacturer, and Cloud9 helicopters became an independent dealer for the same manufacturer.
Cloud9 Helicopters no longer had incentive to complete the project and the owner/builder had lost interest, so in September 2018, the owner/builder contacted AutoGyro USA to broker the sale of his gyroplane.
Cloud9 Helicopters agreed to complete the condition inspection and the phase one flight testing in advance of an airshow that began November 1, 2018. At the time the agreement was made, which was on or about September 18th, 2018, the
gyroplane had not accrued any additional flight hours since the previous flight testing had ceased. According to the President of Cloud9 Helicopters, he and 3 other pilots completed the flight tests between October 4 and 29, 2018.
On October 29, 2018, the accident pilot (Chris Lord), who was the chief operating officer for AutoGyro USA, took possession of the gyroplane from Cloud9 Helicopters. His inspection of the accident gyroplane and its logbooks revealed that the
hobbs meter displayed exactly 40.0 hours, the carburetors leaked, and
completion of the 40-hour flight test period had not been documented in the maintenance logs. The president of Cloud9 Helicopters then made the log entry and added that
the gyroplane "needed a rotor balance." The pilot then pointed out the carburetor leaks to the mechanic who had assisted with the build and completed the most recent condition inspection. The mechanic went for tools to address the leaks and returned to find the pilot had departed in the gyroplane.
The accident pilot then flew the gyroplane from North Palm Beach County Airport (F45), West Palm Beach, Florida to SEF. During the flight, the pilot noted that the
cyclic control vibration was "excessive," and the airspeed indicator was inoperative. In text messages to the president of AutoGyro USA,
the pilot stated, "…carbs leaking fuel, airspeed indicator not working, [and] can mix eggs with this control stick," and
"I see how roughly this was put together." The accident pilot attached a video to the message to showing the control stick shaking during the flight. The president of AutoGyro USA stated that, after landing, the pilot and a colleague examined the gyroplane and found the airspeed indicator "disconnected." They retorqued the carburetor float bowls, and
"wondered if the 40 hours Phase 1 testing had been done." The two further attempted to balance the rotor system through trial and error by adding and then subtracting weight on either side of the rotor head, which was unsuccessful on each attempt and subsequent test flights. AutoGyro USA offered to ship the necessary rotor balancing equipment to the accident pilot, who rejected the idea.
The gyroplane's impact damaged power lines, a power pole, and a residence. Photographs revealed that the pole was fractured into three sections and that the power lines were severed and entangled with the wreckage. The residence was consumed by the postcrash fire. The power pole was replaced and the powerlines were repaired before the wreckage examination.
The wreckage path was oriented along a heading of about 290° and was about 39 ft long. The initial impact point was about 25 ft beyond the power pole. During the wreckage examination, all major gyroplane components were not accounted for at the accident site due to the extent of the fire damage. Identifiable components of the gyroplane included the rotor system, the engine, and the main landing gear cross-tube. The wreckage path ended at the engine, which was partially embedded in the residence. Landing gear wheels and tires were scattered outside the residence. The remainder of the gyroplane was consumed in the postcrash fire.
The rotor system was found between the initial impact point and the residence and remained attached to the pylon structure. The rotor system was largely intact and displayed signatures consistent with impact and heat exposure. Spiral striations consistent with wire contact and signatures consistent with electrical arcing were visible on the rotor blades. The rotor blades were secure in their grips, and the pitch and roll push/pull cable controls and pre-rotator drive were attached to the rotor head.
The cockpit side of the roll control rod end bearing was found attached to the impact and fire-damaged aluminum roll control bellcrank. The rod end bearing was found separated from the push/pull cable end. The inner and outer pieces of the cable end were found separated from the inner push/pull cable. The cable end (threaded portion) and rod end bearing for pitch control were separated from the inner push/pull cable. The braided end of the pitch control cable was corroded but less so than the rest of the cable. The outer braided sheath for pitch control was separated from inner cable. The rod end bearing for pitch was not attached to the control horn. The bolt and nut were not installed or found after sifting through the wreckage. The exposed ends of both the pitch and roll cables appeared pulled from their respective sheaths and rod ends. The main flight control tube was corroded but intact.
The pitch control horn had two welded tangs (left and right); When assembled, the rod-end bearing to the pitch-control cable was placed between the tangs, and a bolt passed through one tang, the rod-end bearing, and the other tang and secured with a threaded locking nut. As found, the
right-side tang was bent inward toward the left-side tang.
The bolt holes and the tangs appeared intact and undamaged. The pitch control horn and the pitch control rod end bearing were further examined by the National Transportation Safety Board's Materials Laboratory.
The Materials Laboratory found that the holes for the bolt were corroded but did not exhibit any deformation or signs that the rod end had been pulled from the pitch horn and that the damage was consistent with the rod end not having been attached to the pitch horn at the time of the accident.