NTSB REPORT re: Chris Lord Cavalon ..... Released the other day ..... I selected some portions and highlighted portions of it .... pretty sobering reading as far as "build quality" and "inspections"

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/Repor ... L&IType=FA

On October 30, 2018, about 1448 eastern daylight time, an experimental amateur-built AutoGyro Cavalon gyroplane, N198LT, was destroyed during collision with a power pole, wires, terrain, a residence and a post-crash fire following a forced landing in Sebring, Florida. The commercial pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were fatally injured.

The purpose of the accident flight was for the pilot to take the passenger back to his home airport. Witnesses stated the pilot flew the accident gyroplane earlier in the day for about 2 hours, serviced it with fuel, then he and the passenger departed on the accident flight.

SEF was not tower-controlled, but a commercial website that monitored the common traffic advisory frequency recorded a mayday call from the gyroplane at 1448. During the next 18 seconds, part of the gyroplane's registration number and a second mayday call were transmitted before the sounds associated with impact were heard. During the audible portions of the transmissions, sounds consistent with an engine increasing and decreasing in rpm were heard.

According to FAA records, the gyroplane's airworthiness certificate was issued August 17, 2017. Airframe logbooks were not recovered, but photographs of maintenance entries revealed the most recent condition inspection was completed October 4, 2018 at 16.6 total aircraft hours.

Postaccident interviews, e-mails, and collected documents revealed that the owner/builder purchased the gyroplane kit from the German kit manufacturer through AutoGyro USA, Stevensville, Maryland, along with a "build-assist" agreement with Cloud9 Helicopters, West Palm Beach, Florida, an independent dealer of AutoGyro USA products.

The owner/builder had no experience building or flying aircraft of any kind. His intention was to build the gyroplane and then learn to fly it. Cloud9 Helicopters agreed to perform the build-assist in exchange for 75 flight hours in the completed gyroplane in order to demonstrate the product to prospective customers for future sales.

After an experienced factory mechanic could not be arranged by the CEO of AutoGyro USA, Cloud9 Helicopters employed a mechanic who had not previously assembled an AutoGyro product, which conservatively required 3 weeks for assembly by an experienced builder.

Later, an experienced AutoGyro builder, who could provide only one week's help was brought in to temporarily assist with building efforts.

Upon arrival, the experienced builder directed that the gyroplane be disassembled because components had been installed incorrectly and in the wrong sequence.

He found all the parts, components, and hardware had arrived with the kit, but they were packaged haphazardly, and considerable time was expended as the contents of the boxes were inventoried and organized for assembly. Further, common consumables (adhesives, lubricants, etc.) were not on hand and had to be purchased. According to the owner/builder, he "spent a lot of time going to Home Depot

After the airworthiness certificate was issued, the gyroplane was test flown for the phase one testing period (40 hours). The test pilot hired to complete the flight testing stated that the test plan was modeled after FAA Advisory Circular 90-89A, Amateur-Built Aircraft and Ultralight Flight Testing Handbook. As part of the plan, the test pilot performed engine run-ups, system checks (pre-rotator, etc), high-speed taxi tests and short "hops" over the runway about 20 ft above the ground.

The test pilot stated that during the testing the cyclic control exhibited a "sharp left pull" and that he explained the issue to maintenance personnel. The test pilot also stated that multiple exchanges with maintenance personnel and AutoGyro USA failed to resolve the issue.

The test pilot further stated that he "grounded" the gyroplane at that time due to "improperly rigged flight controls" and indicated that he would not fly the gyroplane again until it was fixed. At the time that the test pilot ceased the test plan, the gyroplane had accrued 16.6 hours.

According to the owner/builder, the CEO of AutoGyro USA and the president of Cloud9 Helicopters were "not available" in the months following to complete the fly-off.

In March 2018, the CEO of AutoGyro USA resigned his position and went to work for a competing gyroplane manufacturer, and Cloud9 helicopters became an independent dealer for the same manufacturer. Cloud9 Helicopters no longer had incentive to complete the project and the owner/builder had lost interest, so in September 2018, the owner/builder contacted AutoGyro USA to broker the sale of his gyroplane.

Cloud9 Helicopters agreed to complete the condition inspection and the phase one flight testing in advance of an airshow that began November 1, 2018. At the time the agreement was made, which was on or about September 18th, 2018, the gyroplane had not accrued any additional flight hours since the previous flight testing had ceased. According to the President of Cloud9 Helicopters, he and 3 other pilots completed the flight tests between October 4 and 29, 2018.

On October 29, 2018, the accident pilot (Chris Lord), who was the chief operating officer for AutoGyro USA, took possession of the gyroplane from Cloud9 Helicopters. His inspection of the accident gyroplane and its logbooks revealed that the hobbs meter displayed exactly 40.0 hours, the carburetors leaked, and completion of the 40-hour flight test period had not been documented in the maintenance logs. The president of Cloud9 Helicopters then made the log entry and added that the gyroplane "needed a rotor balance." The pilot then pointed out the carburetor leaks to the mechanic who had assisted with the build and completed the most recent condition inspection. The mechanic went for tools to address the leaks and returned to find the pilot had departed in the gyroplane.


The accident pilot then flew the gyroplane from North Palm Beach County Airport (F45), West Palm Beach, Florida to SEF. During the flight, the pilot noted that the cyclic control vibration was "excessive," and the airspeed indicator was inoperative. In text messages to the president of AutoGyro USA, the pilot stated, "…carbs leaking fuel, airspeed indicator not working, [and] can mix eggs with this control stick," and "I see how roughly this was put together." The accident pilot attached a video to the message to showing the control stick shaking during the flight. The president of AutoGyro USA stated that, after landing, the pilot and a colleague examined the gyroplane and found the airspeed indicator "disconnected." They retorqued the carburetor float bowls, and "wondered if the 40 hours Phase 1 testing had been done." The two further attempted to balance the rotor system through trial and error by adding and then subtracting weight on either side of the rotor head, which was unsuccessful on each attempt and subsequent test flights. AutoGyro USA offered to ship the necessary rotor balancing equipment to the accident pilot, who rejected the idea.

The gyroplane's impact damaged power lines, a power pole, and a residence. Photographs revealed that the pole was fractured into three sections and that the power lines were severed and entangled with the wreckage. The residence was consumed by the postcrash fire. The power pole was replaced and the powerlines were repaired before the wreckage examination.

The wreckage path was oriented along a heading of about 290° and was about 39 ft long. The initial impact point was about 25 ft beyond the power pole. During the wreckage examination, all major gyroplane components were not accounted for at the accident site due to the extent of the fire damage. Identifiable components of the gyroplane included the rotor system, the engine, and the main landing gear cross-tube. The wreckage path ended at the engine, which was partially embedded in the residence. Landing gear wheels and tires were scattered outside the residence. The remainder of the gyroplane was consumed in the postcrash fire.

The rotor system was found between the initial impact point and the residence and remained attached to the pylon structure. The rotor system was largely intact and displayed signatures consistent with impact and heat exposure. Spiral striations consistent with wire contact and signatures consistent with electrical arcing were visible on the rotor blades. The rotor blades were secure in their grips, and the pitch and roll push/pull cable controls and pre-rotator drive were attached to the rotor head.

The cockpit side of the roll control rod end bearing was found attached to the impact and fire-damaged aluminum roll control bellcrank. The rod end bearing was found separated from the push/pull cable end. The inner and outer pieces of the cable end were found separated from the inner push/pull cable. The cable end (threaded portion) and rod end bearing for pitch control were separated from the inner push/pull cable. The braided end of the pitch control cable was corroded but less so than the rest of the cable. The outer braided sheath for pitch control was separated from inner cable. The rod end bearing for pitch was not attached to the control horn. The bolt and nut were not installed or found after sifting through the wreckage. The exposed ends of both the pitch and roll cables appeared pulled from their respective sheaths and rod ends. The main flight control tube was corroded but intact.

The pitch control horn had two welded tangs (left and right); When assembled, the rod-end bearing to the pitch-control cable was placed between the tangs, and a bolt passed through one tang, the rod-end bearing, and the other tang and secured with a threaded locking nut. As found, the right-side tang was bent inward toward the left-side tang. The bolt holes and the tangs appeared intact and undamaged. The pitch control horn and the pitch control rod end bearing were further examined by the National Transportation Safety Board's Materials Laboratory. The Materials Laboratory found that the holes for the bolt were corroded but did not exhibit any deformation or signs that the rod end had been pulled from the pitch horn and that the damage was consistent with the rod end not having been attached to the pitch horn at the time of the accident.

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I found it hard to understand parts of the last 2 paragraphs

...... "cockpit side of the roll control rod end bearing was found attached to the impact and fire-damaged aluminum roll control bellcrank"

..... I understand this to be the attachment to the pedals under the cabin floor ....

..... and where it says .... " pitch control horn" .... is on the rotor head itself .... do I have that right ??

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I could be wrong but to me this picture is the .... "pitch control horn with two welded tangs " referred to in the report.

It also has the pneumatic trim attached ..... which would also be inoperable if the bolt came out .... I mention this because according to the manufacturer some control can be maintained by using trim if the cables fail

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BOLT CAME OUT, BENT TANG AS IT WENT THE LAST BIT EXITING THE ASSEMBLY.


THE CABLE HOUSING ATTACHED TO THE UPPER MAST THAT SEPERATED FROM IMPACT PULLED CABLE SHEATH APART.


BAD PERFLIGHT

NO DOUBLE SAFTY ON CONTROL HARDWARE

SO sad. Chris was one of the truly nice guys.....

I didn't know Chris, but many of my friends did. They all spoke well of him.

My question out of this report is after telling the A&P the carbs are leaking, he goes to get tools to fix it, and they take off anyway? That screams of cover your ass after the fact by the Mech....why bother to tell him if your not going to let them fix it?

In the world of demo, there's an unwritten rule, no cameras downrange,ever. Nothing good ever comes of the pics. If something does go wrong the survivors can make up what ever stories they need to. Cameras have a way of messing that up.

I'm not accusing anyone of anything, but all my friends say he was an accomplished gyro pilot. So in my book, that doesn't add up.

Also, I am admittedly not familiar with the Cavalon, but I used to remember that teleflex cables were NOT to be used on primary controls? Has that changed?
Were the brackets U shaped for ease of installation or O shaped to retain them in the event they got slack? I dunno, but I sure wouldn't like a U bracket on something that important.

Its a sad loss, but I think there's more to this story between the Cloud 9 and the desire to get the machine demoed/sellable. The hobbs being at 40 hours but not recorded and them telling Chris to get it to a show.

On a somewhat different note I notice on Barnstormers on any given day the MAJORITY of gyroplanes listed for sale are Cavalons. I have often wondered are they THAT popular or do people want to ditch them after buying them?

Ditching. Unforgiving and unibody. Slam it once and it's done!

Wow, just wow.
Had a long talk today about tall tails and the aerodynamic forces at play against them.
Very interesting.

I don't think I would agree with that statement. Jim is not the only source I would rely on.
Expand your research a bit.

Now Gabs did I say it was a negative conversation?

Just said it was interesting.

I don't like how they look. But that's just me.
Sorry Narnie not tryin to Bogart your thread...

...No problem .... this is a wide open thread as far as I am concerned .... I just happened to be sitting around doing nothing when the NTSB report came out so I posted it.

Glad to see you are finally building your SC ...... I am also relieved you made it thru San Francisco intact .... they say there is human poop on the streets and many of the women are actually men .... haaaaaaaaaaaa

There are a lot of Cavalons listed on barnstormers because most of those are for sale through dealers. Just a bunch of people trying to get a piece of the pie. I’ve often said it’s not a beginner Gyro and I can’t tell you how many people I give demo rides to and suggest they get a different Gyro to start with. Most of them have more money than sense. Can’t talk them out of a Gyro because they like the eye candy. It’s a nice Gyro for what it’s built for but can be very unforgiving.

Just a very sad chain of events. I knew Chris as a very careful pilot. Of course as PIC, ultimate responsibility rests with him. For whatever reason, a series of mistakes were made, resulting in a disaster. Just very sad.

Annie, correct me if I am wrong, but that appears to be the roll control horn, not the pitch control horn?

You would know better than me (I am mostly a helicopter guy) ..... I guess my main "question" is whether the missing bolt was on the rotor head (easy to see) or under the floor at the stick (not able to see)

And like I said earlier , the last 2 paragraphs of the report are hard for me to understand .... any help is appreciated ... I have always been leery of push-pull cables on main controls .... and the severe stick shake on that Cavalon would make it even worse

thanks

In the previous NTSB ...FACTUAL report issues a few weeks ago ...there were pictures of the control linkage area(lower area ...hard to inspect ...work-on after final assembly) showing the bolt & nut that were likely the mechanical failure point. stick to linkage ...NOT the upper teleflex to rotor head ...as pictured! Initially Desmon thought the upper linkage would likely be the failure point( lots of lazy mechanics make unauthorized adjustments ...up there ...so sometimes ...only a few threads hold it all together!) .... but the rotor,rotorhead were caught in wire & not burned up ...and shown intact!

Another interesting point (...Autogyro CYA .-AFTER the FACT) .. the NEW POH for Cavalon ...came out AFTER the accident ...all that operational BS about being able to fly & control to landing using pneumatic trim ...in event of primary rotor control failure! ...Yes test pilots have shown ...that you can control by gentle turns & trim system for rotor pitch if the teleflex cable broke ...but if the control stick ...cable area was JAMMED BY a errant bolt & nut in the horn area ....????? .....If anyone could have flown this to a safe landing area by trim & engine power ...I believe Chris Lord could have done it!
Like most here I liked Chris a lot ... he was a very good kind person & treated gyro customers of his various gyros sold ...very well ...and in one case above & beyond ..even when not his sale ...to rectify problems!

That said, he ALSO had a history of cavalier attitude to preflight inspection and less than stellar ADM ... which as some have said ...was "getting too cocky" ...and that contributed to the chain of events that led to this horrific accident! ( Yes ... I am sure MANY of us ...get a little overconfident as pilots ...as the trouble-free hours /experience build ...I have to keep humbling myself regularly ...and too remember Stan's ....exit from rotor-aviation reasons! ..when he realized he was becoming less rigorous in his approach!)
I can see the " attitudes" from AG USA ...that has influenced this report ... deflecting ...their responsibility ...with the poor build history /customer support to get the machine RIGHT! CYA ..with new POH emergency instructions! ...published POST-accident!

The PIC ...is the ultimate arbiter of airworthiness for each & every flight! No question that Chris L was reckless ... taking his friend Chris Brugger on a flight ...in a known PROBLEM machine ...(likely NOT full 40 flown off , incomplete logbook records ...previous test pilot said it was a 'death-trap' . (refused to fly until control rigging issues addressed). ......I'm just so sad that two good men died so horribly ....when the insanity ADM was made - of going ahead to fly that "problem-machine" added all that extra weight of full fuel and an(illegal-to-be flown) passenger ...increased the stresses on an un-defined rotor-control problem!
I will miss both Chris's ...they were both good people & left behind devastated young families, loved ones & friends! My heart aches for Crissa,Candy & all their family!